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A commentary on:
Null hypothesis significance tests. A mix–up of two different theories: the basis for widespread
confusion and numerous misinterpretations
by Schneider, J. W. (2015). Scientometrics 102, 411–432. doi: 10.1007/s11192-014-1251-5
Schneider’s (2015) article is contemporary work addressing the shortcomings of null hypothesis
significance testing (NHST). It summarizes previous work on the topic and provides original exam-
ples illustrating NHST-induced confusions in scientometrics. Among the confusions cited are those
associated with the interpretation of p-values, old misinterpretations already investigated by Oakes
(1986), Falk and Greenbaum (1995); Haller and Krauss (2000), and Perezgonzalez (2014a), and dis-
cussed in, for example, Carver (1978); Nickerson (2000), Hubbard and Bayarri (2003); Kline (2004),
and Goodman (2008). That they are still relevant in recent times testifies to the fact that the lessons
of the past have not been learnt.
As the title anticipates, there is a twist to this saga, a pedagogical one: p-values are typically taught
and presented as probabilities, and this may be the cause behind the confusions. A change in the
heuristic we use for teaching and interpreting the meaning of p-values may be all we need to start
working the path toward clarification and understanding.
In this article I will illustrate the differences in interpretation that a percentile heuristic and a
probability one make. As guiding example, I will use a one-tailed p-value in a normal distribution—
z = −1.75, p = 0.04; Figure 1). The default testing approach will be Fisher’s tests of significance,
but Neyman–Pearson’s tests of acceptance approach will be assumed when discussing Type I
errors and alternative hypotheses (for more information about those approaches see Perezgonza-
lez, 2014b, 2015). The scenario is the scoring of a sample of suspected schizophrenics on a validated
psychological normality scale. The hypothesis tested (Fisher’s H0, Neyman–Pearson’s HM) is that
the mean score of the sample on the normality scale does not differ from that of the normal pop-
ulation (no H0 = the sample does not score as normal; HA = the sample scores as schizophrenic,
assuming previous knowledge that schizophrenics score low on the scale, by a given effect size).
Neither a level of significance nor a rejection region is needed for the discussion.
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FIGURE 1 | Location of an observed z-score and its corresponding
p-value in the frequency distribution of the hypothesis under test. The
accompanying scales are for the theoretical z-scores and percentiles,
respectively.
P-Values: Probabilities or Percentiles?
Let’s start by establishing that p-values can be interpreted as prob-
abilities. That is, when hypothetical population distributions are
generated from sampling data, those frequency distributions fol-
low the frequentist approach and the associated p-values show
the appropriate probabilities. This is so because these p-values
are theoretical—they represent the probability of, for example, a
hypothetical human being alive today.
The p-value we obtain from our research data, however, is not
a theoretical, probabilistic, value, but an observed one: its prob-
ability of occurrence is “1,” precisely because it has occurred—
it represents, for example, the realization that I am alive, not
the probability of me being so. Therefore, the observed p-value
does not represent a probability but a location in the distribu-
tion of reference. Among measures of location, percentiles (i.e.,
percentile ranks) are good heuristics to represent what observed
p-values really are.
P-Values’ Correct and Incorrect
Misinterpretations
As Figure 1 shows, a percentile describes a fact: the sample scored
in the 4th percentile. As a probability, however, the p-value is
often misinterpreted as, the observed result has a 4% likelihood
of having occurred by chance—the odds-against-chance fantasy
(Carver, 1978)—which also elicits a further misinterpretation as,
the observed result has a 96% likelihood of being a real effect
(Kline, 2004).
The percentile heuristic also conveys the correct interpreta-
tion of the p-value as a cumulative percentage in the tail of the
distribution: 4% of normal people will score this low or lower. As
a probability, the p-value is often misinterpreted as, the sample
has only a 4% likelihood of being normal—the inverse probability
error (Cohen, 1994).
Consequently, because the percentile only provides informa-
tion about location in the distribution of the normal scores
hypothesis, it is impossible to know the probability of making a
mistake if this hypothesis is rejected. As a probability, the p-value
is often misinterpreted as, there is only a 4% likelihood of mak-
ing a mistake when rejecting the tested hypothesis. This is further
confused as, the probability of making a Type I error in the long
run (alpha, α) is 4%; which then leads to the belief that α can
be adjusted a posteriori—roving α (Goodman, 1993)—as a lower
than anticipated Type I error (Kline, 2004; Perezgonzalez, 2015).
Furthermore, the percentile is circumscribed to its hypothesis
of reference—normal scores on the normality test—and makes
no concession for non-tested hypotheses. As a probability, the
p-value is often misinterpreted as, there is a 96% likelihood
that the sample scored as not normal—Fisher’s negation of H0,
the valid research hypothesis fantasy (Carver, 1978)—or scored
as schizophrenic—Neyman–Pearson’s HA, the validity fallacy
(Mulaik et al., 1997).
Finally, the percentile heuristic helps ameliorate misinterpre-
tations regarding future replicability, if only because we normally
have enough experience with percentiles in other spheres of life as
to realize that the big fish in this pond is neither necessarily big all
the time nor equally big in all ponds. As a probability, the p-value
is often misinterpreted as, there is a 96% likelihood that similar
samples will score this low in future studies—the replicability or
reliability fallacy (Carver, 1978).
Conclusions
The percentile heuristic is a more accurate model both for inter-
preting observed p-values and for preventing probabilistic mis-
understandings. The percentile heuristic may also prove to be a
better starting point for demystifying related statistical issues—
such as the relationship among p-value, effect size and sample
size—and epistemological issues—such as statistical significance,
and the proving and disproving of hypotheses. All in all, the per-
centile heuristic matters for better statistical literacy and better
research competence, allows for clearer understanding without
imposing unnecessary cognitive workload, and has a positive
effect in fostering the teaching and practice of psychological
science.
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